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This study clarified two different mechanisms of how HRM systems developed on 
the basis of Employee-Organization Relationship (EOR) framework (Tsui, Pearce, 
Porter, & Tripoli, 1997) affect the organizational ambidexterity. After classifying 
the HRM practices into two dimensions, HRM inducements and investments and 
ii 
HRM expectation-enhancing practices, this study clustered firms into four different 
groups based on the level of the two HRM dimensions. The study suggests that the 
firms adopting mutual investment EOR forms, referring to the clustered group with 
high level of both the HRM dimensions, would improve the explorative and 
exploitative performance through organizational trust and human capital. Using 
data from 319 Korean firms, clustered regression was executed to test the 
hypotheses. The results confirmed that the firms with mutual investment EOR 
forms have positive relationships with organizational trust and human capital. 
Furthermore, organizational trust and human capital are positively related to the 
firm’s explorative and exploitative performance. Overall, organizational trust and 
human capital mediated the relationship between the mutual investment EOR form 
and the firm’s explorative and exploitative performance. This study reveals that in 
addition to psychological path of organizational trust, firms adopting mutual 
investment EOR forms can enhance the organizational explorative and exploitative 
performances by attracting and retaining the highly qualified human resources, 
leading to achieve sustainable competitive advantages. 
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In the strategic HRM literature, a plethora of studies corroborated the 
relationship between human resource management systems and firm performances 
(Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). Following the 
seminal work of Huselid (1995), researches on high-performance work systems 
(HPWS) (Becker & Huselid, 1998; Sun, Aryee, & Law, 2007; Patel, Messersmith, 
& Lepak, 2013), high involvement work practices (Guthrie, 2001; Zatzick & 
Iverson, 2006; Wood & Menezes, 2008), and high commitment HRM practices 
(McClean & Collins, 2011; Collins & Smith, 2006) have burgeoned, underlining 
that firms must implement effective HRM systems in order to sustain their 
competitive advantages. However, prior studies in this line of researches possess 
two limitations. First, solid theoretical foundation for integrating each HRM 
practice into one holistic HRM system has been insufficient (Wright & McMahan, 
1992). Second, horizontal fit or synergetic effects between idiosyncratic HRM 
practices are not guaranteed without empirical tests for the interaction effects.  
To remedy these weaknesses of prior research, this study adopted 
Employee-Organization Relationship (EOR) framework suggested by Tsui, Pearce, 
Porter, & Tripoli (1997). This framework, developed on the basis of Blau’s (1964) 
social exchange theory, distinguishes two different dimensions of HRM systems, 
which are HRM inducements and investments (HRMI) (e.g., competitive pay, 
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extensive training, education opportunities) and HRM expectation-enhancing 
practices (HRME) (e.g., pay-for-performance, performance appraisal, monitoring 
system) (Tsui et al., 1995; Shaw, Dineen, & Fang, 2009). Especially in the context 
of South Korea, EOR approaches present interesting implications, since radical 
changes in the form of employment relationships has taken place in Korea. Most 
companies had provided lifetime employment and chosen seniority-based 
compensation system, which implies that a great extent of job security had been 
given for employees. Firms had invested in the human resources for a longer period 
of time and the employees also had made enough contributions balancing with the 
firms’ investments and inducements. However, as globalization has been 
accelerated, multi-national firms confront fierce competition. Moreover, 
development of external labor market has changed employment relationships 
dramatically. Under these circumstances, investigating the effects of EOR-based 
HRM system is expected to provide both academic and practical insights.  
To date, most of the EOR researchers have concentrated on individual level 
outcomes, such as organizational commitment, individual performance, 
psychological empowerment, and trust (Tsui et al., 1995; Zhang, Tsui, Song, Li, & 
Jia, 2008; Zhang, Song, Tsui, & Fu, 2014; Shin, Taylor, & Seo, 2012; Hom, Tsui, 
Wu, Lee, Zhang, Fu, & Li, 2009). However, only a few studies examined the direct 
relationships between the EOR forms and the overall firm performance (Wang, Tsui, 
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Zhang, & Ma, 2003), and little is known about the effects of the EOR forms on the 
operational performances and the intervening processes of the effects (Coyle-
Shapiro & Shore, 2007). Thus, the effects of the HRM systems based on the EOR 
approach on the organizational level outcomes, such as human capital and firm 
performances, should be closely examined.  
Previous research argues that measuring firm performance with global 
performance measures, such as productivity or profitability, might underestimate 
the effectiveness of the HRM practices (Collis & Montgomery, 1995; Crook, Todd, 
Gombs, Woehr, & Ketchen, 2011). Therefore, this study adopted the two 
operational performances, exploitation and exploration, as dependent variables in 
order to estimate the effectiveness of EOR-based HRM system in detail. In highly 
competitive markets, firms should be able to fulfill both demands of exploitation 
and exploration simultaneously in order to sustain their own competitiveness (Park 
& Kim, 2015; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 
2009). However, how to pursue the organizational ambidexterity through the HRM 
systems remains obscure. 
As intervening processes between the EOR-based HRM system and the 
firm’s explorative and exploitative performance, I suggested dual routes of 
organizational trust and human capital. The first route is organizational trust, a 
critical component of the social exchange literature (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007). 
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This study aims to explain the cognitive process of how the employees trust the 
organization in the mutual investment EOR form and test the mediating role of 
organizational trust empirically. The second route is human capital. Besides the 
social exchange route, high level of human capital is consequential for the firm to 
pursue both exploitation and exploration simultaneously (O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2004). Most studies demonstrating the relationship between HRM systems and 
organizational ambidexterity have not measured the level of human capital directly, 
as it is taken for granted, but whether HRM practices enhance the actual level of 
human resources should be verified.  
In summary, this study provides theoretical contributions on finding out the 
black box between EOR-based HRM system and firm’s explorative and 
exploitative performance by revealing the mediating process of organizational trust 
and human capital. Figure 1 demonstrates the overall research model investigated 

















Ⅱ. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Employee-Organization Relationship framework 
Tsui et al. (1997) suggested employee-organization relationship (EOR) 
framework based on the concept of inducement-contribution (March & Simon, 
1958) and social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). EOR approach includes two 
components: “the employer’s expectations about specific contributions that it 
desires from employees and the inducements that it uses to affect the desired 

















Regarding how to measure EOR forms, some studies investigated EOR at 
individual level ( Jia, Shaw, Tsui, & Park, 2014; Tsui et al., 1997; Zhang et al., 2008) 
and other studies collected EOR data at the firm level, such as utilizing HRM 
practices implemented by the firm (Hom et al., 2009; Shaw et al., 2009). Hom et al. 
(2009) pointed out that EOR data collected at individual level may overestimate 
EOR effects, considering that observations from the same firm are not independent, 
which results in inflating degrees of freedom. In addition, the concept of EOR is 
from the employer’s perspective, which is differentiated from psychological 
contract including both side of the exchange between employer and employee 
(Robinson, 1996; Rousseau, 1989). Tsui et al. (1997) stated that since employment 
contracts are mostly decided and altered by the employer, analyzing EOR from the 
employer’s perspective is better. Therefore, using the HRM practices implemented 
by the company reflects the original concept of EOR from the employer’s 
perspective. 
Tsui et al. (1997) derived four EOR forms based on two continua of offered 
inducements and expected contributions: Mutual investment, quasi-spot contract, 
overinvestment, and underinvestment. Mutual investment and quasi-spot contract 
are balanced EOR forms, meaning that the level of inducements offered by the 
employer matches with the level of contributions expected from the employee 
(Hom et al., 2009; Shaw et al., 2009). Mutual investment EOR refers to the 
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combination of a high level of expected contributions and a high level of offered 
inducements (Wang et al., 2003). The employer considers the employees’ well-
being and gives a long-term investment in the employees, and in turn the employees 
are expected to contribute to the organization beyond their individual jobs clarified 
in their job descriptions (Tsui et al., 1997; Wang et al., 2003). The opposite of the 
mutual investment EOR is a quasi-spot contract EOR, where the expected 
contributions and offered inducements are narrow or low (Wang et al., 2003; Tsui 
et al., 1997). This EOR type is based on a pure economic exchange model (Tusi et 
al., 1997). The exchange between the employer and the employee is specified and 
short-term (Tusi et al., 1997). The other two types of EOR are unbalanced EOR 
forms, which imply that the level of offered inducements mismatches with the level 
of expected contributions (Wang et al., 2003). Overinvestment EOR has high level 
of inducements offered to the employees with low level of expected contributions 
from the employees. Traditionally many government-owned companies in Korea 
adopted this type of EOR form in favor of employees. The employees in those 
companies were not expected to contribute beyond their narrowly-specified jobs, 
while receiving broad inducements and investments, such as job security and a 
considerable amount of remuneration. However, facing severe global competitions 
between firms nowadays, those firms are trying to convert into the underinvestment 
EOR form. Underinvestment EOR is a combination of a high level of expected 
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contributions from the employee and a low level of offered inducements, in favor 
of the employer. The employer does not provide long-term investment to the 
employees, and the employees are obliged to provide broad and open-ended 
performances.   
 
EOR-based HRM system and organizational ambidexterity 
According to literature on organizational ambidexterity, firms should keep 
refining the current internal systems or products, pursuing efficiency in cost, and 
improving the product quality. At the same time, firms should also put their efforts 
for the future opportunities, such as diversification of the products, attraction of 
new potential customers, and management of brand images. The former activities 
refer to ‘exploitation’ and the latter activities refer to ‘exploration’ (March, 1991).  
To balance the conflicting demands on exploitation (or alignment) and 
exploration (or adaptation), researchers developed two possible ways, which are 
structural ambidexterity (Duncan, 1976) and contextual ambidexterity (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw; 2004). Structural ambidexterity refers to dividing the role of 
developing new future opportunities and enhancing current effectiveness or 
efficiency into dual structures, some aiming at exploration, others focusing on 
exploitation (Duncan, 1976). Contextual ambidexterity developed by Gibson and 
Birkinshaw (2004) is “the behavioral capacity to simultaneously demonstrate 
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alignment and adaptability across an entire business unit (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004)”. This perspective is focusing on how to build the processes or systems that 
encourage individuals to manage the conflicting demands of aligning current 
opportunities and adapting to the fast changing environment for potentially 
profitable opportunities (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). 
This study took a view of contextual ambidexterity, in that HRM practices are 
critical systems making employees motivated and skilled (Jiang et al., 2012). 
Highly motivated and skilled individuals have resource flexibility and they are 
driving forces of the balanced organizational performances of exploration and 
exploitation (Patel et al., 2013).  
Ghohsal & Bartlett (1994) suggested four contexts for contextual 
ambidexterity: Discipline and Stretch for alignment, Support and Trust for 
adaptation. Discipline is a context that employees voluntarily fulfilling their 
working standards. Firms with clear performance standards, quick and open 
feedback systems, and consistency in the management system would form the 
context of discipline (Patel et al., 2013; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). HRM 
practices in the expectation-enhancing (HRME) dimension, such as extensive 
feedback and monitoring system accompanied by pay-for-performance system 
would make the employees feel that the organization evaluates and compensates 
the employees in a consistent and reliable way, which in turn forming the context 
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of discipline. Stretch is “an attribute of context that induces members to voluntarily 
strive for more ambitious objectives” (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004: 213). 
Management by objectives in the HRME dimension can enhance the stretch context 
(Patel et al., 2013). Support means “the resources, care, and autonomy provided to 
employees” (Patel et al., 2013: 1423). Competitive pay and benefits and well-
established training systems in the HRM inducements and investments (HRMI) 
dimension signal the employees that the organization cares their well-being (Tsui 
et al., 1997). Trust refers to an attribute related to procedural justice which induces 
employees’ commitment to the organization (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Internal 
labor market and job security in the HRMI dimension could enhance employees’ 
trust on organization. However, this is a narrow definition of trust. In this study, 
organizational trust used as the mediator between EOR-based HRM system and 
organizational ambidexterity includes not only the realm of procedural justice, but 
also other dimensions which can enhance ‘willingness to be vulnerable’ (Mayer et 
al., 1995).  
Though Patel et al. (2013) revealed the relationship between HPWS and 
contextual ambidexterity, there are three limitations in this study. First of all, they 
used HPWS which is a composite index of all the practices enhancing performance 
to investigate the effect on organizational ambidexterity. However, as HPWS is the 
mixture of HRM practices containing different characteristics and implications, the 
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relationship between HPWS and firm performance of alignment and adaptation 
only gives us marginal implications. In order to understand the underlying 
mechanism of how HRM practices influence the firm’s outcome, using the typology 
based on EOR framework is appropriate by linking the inducement-expectation 
dimensions to the four contexts for organizational ambidexterity. Second, they 
didn’t measure the mediating elements between organizational ambidexterity and 
HRM practices. They assumed that HPWS would increase the context for 
ambidexterity conceptually, but didn’t measure the context empirically. Third, they 
didn’t measure if the alignment-enhancing HRM practices and adaptation-
enhancing HRM practices are interacting with each other, as they integrated all the 
practices into one index of HPWS. Therefore, I introduced organizational trust and 
human capital as a mediator between EOR-based HRM system and firm 
performances of exploration and exploitation. 
 
Mediating role of organizational trust 
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995: 712) defined trust as “the willingness 
of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation 
that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective 
of the ability to monitor or control that other party.” Trust is the core element 
forming the social exchange relationship (Colquitt et al., 2007), as the social 
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exchange relationship encompasses an open-ended and vaguely specified roles or 
duties between the parties, necessarily admitting vulnerability of the trustor. As trust 
has been used as an indicator of social exchange relationship in the previous 
literature (Aryee, Budhwar, & Chen, 2002; Shore, Tetrick, Lynch, & Barksdale, 
2006), this study also utilized organizational trust to indicate the social exchange 
route in the relationship between EOR-based HRM system and organizational 
performances.  
Some scholars distinguished trust in two perspectives, which are cognition-
based and affect-based trust (McAllister, 1995; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Lewis & 
Wiegert, 1985). Cognition-based trust is focusing on the perception of the trustee’s 
trustworthiness, such as competence or expertness (Butler, 1991; Giffin, 1967), 
reliability or integrity (Butler, 1991; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Ring & Van 
de Ven, 1992), and benevolence (Solomon, 1960; Larzelere & Huston, 1980). 
Affect-based trust consists of emotional attachment (McAllister, 1995; Lewis & 
Wiegert, 1985), more proximal to the social exchange perspective (Dirks & Ferrin, 
2002). If the trustor believes that the trustee is sincerely caring and considering the 
welfare of the trustor, the trustor is willing to reciprocate and form emotional ties 
toward the trustee (McAllister, 1995). However, in fact, those two dimensions are 
overlapping with each other in some respects. ‘Benevolence’ is a factor constructing 
trustworthiness in cognition-based trust, implying how much the trustee is oriented 
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toward the trustor’s interests, but is analogous to the nature of affect-based trust. 
Moreover, it is difficult to establish strong emotional bonds without knowing 
credibility of the trustee, especially when the trustee is not a person but an 
organization. The link between the employees and the organization is created on the 
basis of the HRM system provided by the organization, and if the employee 
cognitively appreciate that the organization is supportive to them, they trust the 
organization. Therefore, I integrated cognition-based trust and affect-based trust 
into a single dimension of trust, and analyzed how EOR-based HRM system 
increases the trustworthiness of the organization.   
According to Mayer et al. (1995), trustworthiness has three components. 
The first component is ability. Ability is defined as “skills, competencies, and 
characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain 
(Mayer et al., 1995: 717)”. Ability has been considered as a critical antecedent of 
trust in many studies (Cook and Wall, 1980; Deutsch, 1960; Sitkin & Roth, 1993), 
but little is known about how specific HRM practices enhance trustworthiness of 
the organization. Employees can estimate the ability of organization by referencing 
diverse HRM practices, such as higher materialistic and developmental rewards 
compared to other competing companies, implying the organization retains enough 
resources. The second component is benevolence, defined as how much the trustor 
believes that the trustee is willing to do good to the trustor apart from egocentrism 
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(Mayer et al., 1995). HRM practices in the HRMI dimension, such as competitive 
pay and abundant educational opportunities by which general human capital is 
developed, would make the employees feel the organization is benevolent and 
caring, in turn, fostering a sense of positive affect (Colquitt et al., 2007; McAllister, 
1995). Last component of trustworthiness is integrity, defined as the extent to which 
a trustee is believed to adhere to sound moral and ethical principles, such as fairness, 
justice, consistency, and promise fulfillment (Colquitt et al., 2007). In the literature 
of compensation, pay-for-performance enhances the employees’ perception of 
distributive justice (Greenberg, 1990). Performance appraisal systems, such as 
Balanced Scorecard, MBO, or multisource evaluation system, also build up the 
reliability of the firm (Mayer & Davis, 1999). If the organization has the pay-for-
performance system in the absence of reasonable performance appraisal systems, 
the employees would not be motivated to put much effort on their work, based on 
the expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Monitoring systems, such as executing 
feedback systems and utilizing the appraisal results for the opportunities of 
promotion, transfer, or training, also have positive effects on the perceived fairness 
(Alder & Ambrose, 2005). In short, HRME such as pay-for-performance, 
performance appraisal, and monitoring enhance the perceived justice or fairness, 
referring to integrity. To sum up, the level of trustworthiness can be maximized in 
the mutual investment EOR forms, the combination of high level of HRMI and 
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HRME, forming stable and robust organizational trust.  
Hypothesis 1: Organizational trust is highest when the organization adopts 
the mutual investment EOR approach, relative to other EOR approaches. 
To explore the future opportunities, the organization should take a risk 
deviating from the existing routines. A risk taking behavior is a function of trust and 
perceived risk of the behavior (Mayer et al., 1995). If the perceived risk of the 
behavior is above the level of trust, the trustor is reluctant to engage in the risk 
taking action, whereas if the perceived risk is below the level of trust, the trustor is 
prone to take a risky action (Mayer et al., 1995). As the returns of explorative 
performances are uncertain, distant, and often negative (March, 1991), implying 
high risk, high level of trust is vital to exceed the level of perceived risk of 
exploration. Accordingly, trustworthiness of the trustee becomes a requisite factor 
to be considered.  
However, exploitative performances, such as pursuing efficiency of the 
current procedure and making an incremental improvement of the existing product 
line, are less risky, in that the returns are predictable, proximate, and positive 
(March, 1991). Therefore, the link between trust and exploitative performance is 
relatively weak, compared to that of explorative performance. Indeed, the 
relationship between trust and job performance (relevant to exploitative 
performance in the organizational level) has been inconsistent, as some studies 
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showing a positive relationship between trust and job performance (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie & Bommer, 1996; Mayer & Gavin, 2005; Colquitt et al., 2007; Dirks, 
2000), while others having no significant relationship (Konovsky & Cropanzano, 
1991; O’Reilly & Anderson, 1980). Thus, beyond the risk-focused explanation, 
other perspectives should be complemented to clarify the relationship between trust 
and exploitative performance. Mayer and Gavin (2005) proposed that trust in 
management makes the employees stay focused on their in-role job performances, 
as they don’t need to lavish their limited resources on monitoring the management 
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). If the employees believe that the organization holds 
adequate abilities to survive in the market and is supportive and benevolent to the 
employees with a sense of fairness or integrity, they would not be distracted by 
other unnecessary worries and would be willing to work for the organization beyond 
their own interests. Combined with Hypothesis 1, organizational trust will have the 
mediating effect between EOR-based HRM system and the firm’s performances of 
exploration and exploitation.  
Hypothesis 2: Organizational trust is positively related to explorative 
performance. 
Hypothesis 3: Organizational trust is positively related to exploitative 
performance.  
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between mutual investment EOR approach 
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and explorative performance is mediated by organizational trust.  
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between mutual investment EOR approach 
and exploitative performance is mediated by organizational trust. 
 
Mediating role of human capital 
In the literature of EOR, the social exchange theory and human capital 
theory have been compounded (Shaw et al., 2009; Tsui et al., 1997; Hom et al, Wang 
et al., 2003), and as Coyle-Shapiro and Shore (2007) indicated, the former 
perspective dominated in explaining the effects of EOR on various outcomes (Shore, 
Bommer, Rao, & Seo, 2009; Shin et al., 2012). But the underlying cognitive 
processes of social exchange view and human capital view are not identical. The 
former process is based on the norm of reciprocation, so that if the organization 
gives a lot of benefits to the employee, the employee feels indebtedness to the 
organization. However, the latter process does not necessarily imply psychological 
engagement. Actually individuals have self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 
1999; Bradley, 1978) in many respects. For example, individuals who get paid 
above their ability or performance would rather enhance their self-concept by 
thinking that ‘I deserve that pay.’ than endeavor to solve cognitive dissonance 
(Kanfer, 1990). Therefore, it is plausible that some employees who received a 
considerable amount of investment may not feel strong obligation to the 
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organization. 
This perspective is more based on the economic perspective, assuming 
rationality, in that the only concern of individuals is the maximization of their own 
interests. From this point of view, in order to attract the superior human capital, the 
employer needs to consider specific HRM practices inducing high-quality 
employees. Researchers demonstrated that efficiency wage policy (Akerlof & 
Yellen, 1986) and tuition reimbursement program (Manchester, 2012) in HRMI 
dimension, as well as pay-for-performance (Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007; Rynes, 
Gerhart, & Parks, 2005) and performance evaluation (Rynes et al., 2005) in HRME 
dimension are effective to attract superior human resources respectively. Hom et al. 
(2009) demonstrated that in terms of attraction, assimilation, and attrition processes 
(Goldstein & Smith, 1995), the high performers would maximize their person-job 
fit in the firm with mutual investment EOR form, because demanding and broad 
expectations matches well with the employee’s high ability and skills. 
Retaining the superior human resources in the organization is another 
momentous issue to enhance firm performances. The HRM system should provide 
continuous incentives for high performers to retain them in the organization. From 
the perspective of social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), individuals 
determine where to work by taking into consideration of what others are doing 
(Kilduff, 1990). High performers compare their pay level within the organization 
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and among other alternative jobs. High level of HRME dimension, such as a strict 
pay-for-performance system abided by fair performance evaluation systems make 
them feel receiving reasonable amount of pay compared to other mediocre people 
within the organization. High level of HRMI dimension, such as competitive pay 
or benefits, also gives much incentive for them not to transfer to other alternative 
workplaces. 
In addition, Hom et al. (2009) suggested that mutual investment EORs 
increase links between the employees in the organization by requiring wider range 
of team and corporate responsibilities. Especially for star performers or high-quality 
human capital, because they occupy the core of the social network in the 
organization (Tichy and Tushman, 1979), they have more links than other 
employees (Groysberg et al., 2008). Thus, because of the broad and robust network 
and the following firm-specific skills accumulated by the networking process, the 
superior human resources might be more hesitant to transfer to other firms 
compared to other employees. As a result, the superior human resources in the firms 
adopting mutual investment EOR forms would inevitably abandon more potential 
benefits if they decide to exit the organization, and would be more likely to stay in 
the organization. 
The relationship between high level of human capital and organizational 
ambidexterity have been verified in a myriad of studies (Patel et al., 2013; 
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Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005; Kang and Snell, 2009; Prieto et al., 2012). 
Superior human resources are necessary for the incremental and radical innovations 
of organization.   
Hypothesis 6: Human Capital is highest when the organization adopts the 
mutual investment EOR approach, relative to other EOR approaches. 
Hypothesis 7: Human Capital is positively related to explorative 
performance.  
Hypothesis 8: Human Capital is positively related to exploitative 
performance.  
Hypothesis 9: The relationship between EOR-based HRM system and 
explorative performance is mediated by Human Capital.  
Hypothesis 10: The relationship between EOR-based HRM system and 
exploitative performance is mediated by Human Capital.  
 
Ⅲ. METHOD 
Data and Sample 
To test the hypotheses, the Human Capital Corporate Panel (HCCP) data 
collected by the Korea Research Institute of Vocational Education and Training 
(KRIVET), a government-funded agency, was used. Firms were classified 
according to firm size and ownership types, and samples were selected by using a 
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stratified, random sampling method. Small firms with less than 100 employees were 
excluded from the survey. A total of 482 firms and 10,043 employees participated 
in the survey in 2013.  
The HCCP survey data includes multiple sources of respondents. The 
senior executives or directors for strategy and the HRM directors responded to the 
survey items within their managerial sphere, such as HRM inducements and 
investments, HRM expectation-enhancing practices, the number of total employees, 
firm age, market strategy, management/ownership structure, selective staffing, 
discharge rate and labor-management relationship. The department directors 
answered the survey items about the corporate competitiveness, including human 
capital, explorative performance and exploitative performance. The employees 
answered the questions that were related to organizational trust. After eliminating 
missing data on the focal variables of this study, I included 319 manufacturing 
companies and 9,998 employees for my final analysis. On average, 26 employees 
(SD = 13.47) from each firm answered to the questions regarding organizational 
trust. 79.5% of the respondents were male, and the average age of employees was 
37.78 (SD = 10.826). Regarding the education level, 29% of the respondents 
finished high school or less, 17.1% finished vocational school, 47.3% finished a 






Independent variables  
I combined the individual HRM practices into additive indexes following 
previous research (Hom et al., 2009; Arthur, 1994). Before aggregating, I 
standardized the HRM practice measures and then aggregated them into the HRM 
inducements and investments index and HRM expectation-enhancing practices 
index independently.  
HRM inducements and investments.   I used HRMI dimension from 
previous research of Shaw et al. (2009), but modified specific items. First, I 
dropped ’job security’ and ‘procedural justice’ items in HRMI. Although job 
security is considered to be significant for employees to get involved in the 
organization and commit to the organization (Yousef, 1998), it is ambiguous to 
define the job security at the organizational level as an HRM practice, because 
systems providing job security for employees are different in terms of 
characteristics of industries and firms. I also deleted procedural justice item for 
discriminant validity, because procedural justice items are overlapping with the 
organizational trust items. In the literature of organizational trust, an important 
component constructing the organizational trust is perceived procedural justice 
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(Colquitt & Rodell, 2011; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Also, Tsui et al. (2007) pointed 
out that employees’ perception of fairness is distinguished from EOR approach. 
Second, pay level was measured by the competitive salary of employees. The top 
HRM officers responded to the degree of pay competitiveness with five-point scale. 
As the pay structure within the organization would be different based on the job 
level, I averaged three types of employee salary competitiveness; the 1st year new 
employee, the 1st year junior manager and the 1st year senior manager. Third, I used 
the benefits competitiveness to assess the benefits level. Corresponding with the 
competitive pay level, the competitive benefits was evaluated from the same 
respondents with five-point scale and averaged the benefits competitiveness of 
three job level as an overall benefits competitiveness. Fourth, I operationalized 
training as the extent of utilizing the human resource development programs (1 = 
not at all, 5 = a great deal), such as tuition assistance for external education, college, 
and graduate school, succession planning, career development planning, paid leave 
for education and training, mentoring or coaching, and learning groups. The ratings 
of each development programs were averaged to create an overall training item.  
HRM expectation-enhancing practices.   I operationalized HRME 
dimension according to previous research of Shaw et al. (2009), but modified 
specific items. Pay-for-performance is measured by the number of pay-for-
performance forms (i.e., individual incentive, team incentive, department incentive, 
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corporate incentive, profit sharing, and gain sharing). The maximum score of the 
pay-for-performance dimension is 6, and the minimum score is 0. I measured 
performance appraisal by the number of appraisal system utilized. It includes 6 
items of Balanced Scorecard (BSC), Management by objectives (MBO), ability 
appraisal, leadership appraisal, multi-source appraisal, and other performance 
appraisals. The maximum score of the performance appraisal dimension is 6, and 
the minimum score is 0. I measured monitoring in two dimensions and aggregated 
it into an index. One is “Does your company implement the performance feedback? 
( 1 = yes, 0 = no)”, and the other is the extent of utilizing the appraisal result (i.e., 
“promotion ( 1 = yes, 0 = no)”, “transfer / arrangement ( 1 = yes, 0 = no)”, “poor 
performer management ( 1 = yes, 0 = no)”, “discharging ( 1 = yes, 0 = no)”, 
“training and development ( 1 = yes, 0 = no)”, “career development ( 1 = yes, 0 = 
no)”, “core-employee management ( 1 = yes, 0 = no)”). Full score of the monitoring 
dimension is 8, and the lowest score is 0.   
Organizational Trust.   I measured organizational trust using three items. 
The items are “Our company has a fair evaluation and compensation system (1 = 
not at all, 5 = a great deal).”, “Executives of our company are trustworthy in all 
respects (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal).”, “Our company is worth to be loyal (1 = 
not at all, 5 = a great deal).”. As the items were responded by individual employee, 
I used rwg and ICC statistics to justify the organizational-level aggregation of the 
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organizational trust. The mean within-organization agreement (rwg) was .84, which 
exceeds the usual cutoff value of .70 recommended by George (1990) and James 
(1982), indicating that the employees of the same organization share the perceptions 
of organizational trust. Also, intra-class correlations were acceptable (ICC(1) = .18, 
ICC(2) = .81, F = 6.38, p < .001). Therefore, I aggregated the ratings of 
organizational trust to the organizational level. This measure had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .74, which exceeds the .70 criterion suggested by Nunnally (1978). 
Human Capital.   Human Capital was measured by two items of the 
company’s competitive positioning in the firm’s industry with five-point scale: 
“The overall competence of human resources” and “Acquisition of good human 
resources”. As the department directors completed the survey items related to the 
level of human capital, I also used rwg and ICC statistics to justify the organizational 
level aggregation of the human capital. The mean within-organization agreement 
(rwg) was .86, surpassing the usual cutoff value of .70, which represents that the 
perceptions of organizational competitiveness of human capital among the directors 
in the same organization are comparable. Also, intra-class correlations were 
acceptable (ICC(1) = .21, ICC(2) = .61, F = 2.60, p < .001). Thus, I aggregated the 
ratings of human capital into the organizational level. A Cronbach’s alpha of this 
measure was .89, which was acceptable when referencing the .70 criterion 
recommended by Nunnally (1978). 
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Dependent variables  
Firm performances indicating organizational ambidexterity were measured 
in two dimensions: Explorative and exploitative performance. Explorative 
performance was measured using 3 items about the company’s competitive 
positioning in the industry with five-point scale: “Diversity of the products”, 
“Attraction of new customers” and “Enhancement or management of brand image”. 
Exploitative performance was assessed by 3 items with the same scale as 
explorative performance: “Effectiveness of working procedures”, “Competitive 
advantage through the cost reduction of products” and “The Quality of the 
products”. An exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation resulted in a two-
factor solution. The eigenvalues for the two firm performances were 2.39 for 
explorative performance and 2.08 for exploitative performance. Explorative 
performance had a Cronbach’s alpha of .82, and exploitative performance showed 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .83, which are reliable. All the items loaded on the 
hypothesized factors. Confirmatory factor analysis also confirmed the two-factor 
model (CHI-SQUARE = 129.20, CFI = .980, RFI = .955, RMSEA = .039 (90% CI 
= [.033, .045])).  
As the department directors completed the survey items related to firm 
performances, I used rwg and ICC statistics to justify the organizational level 
aggregation of the firm performance. The mean within-organization agreement (rwg) 
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was .89 for explorative performance and .90 for exploitative performance, 
exceeding the usual cutoff value of .70, indicating that the employees of the same 
organization share the perceptions of organizational competitiveness of firm 
performance. Also, intra-class correlations were acceptable for both explorative 
performance (ICC(1) = .25, ICC(2) = .67, F = 3.03, p <.001) and exploitative 
performance (ICC(1) = .20, ICC(2) = .59, F = 2.46, p <.001). Therefore, I 
aggregated the ratings of firm performance to the organizational level. 
Control variables 
I controlled for several variables that might have potential confounds for 
independent and dependent variables. Firm size was measured by the natural log of 
the number of employees. Industry was grouped into three categories: 
manufacturing, financial, and non-financial industry. Firm age was measured as the 
number of years from the foundation date of the firm. Market strategy was 
controlled because it might influence the relationship between EOR-based HRM 
and firm performance (Wang et al., 2003). Market strategy was categorized into 
three groups: first-mover, fast-follower, and stability. Management system was 
operationalized as four categories: complete owner management system, CEO 
management system with great intervention from the owner, CEO management 
system with a little intervention from the owner, and complete CEO management 
system. Selective staffing was the number of HRM practices implemented for 
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securing the core-employee or good human resources, such as internal development, 
utilization of external headhunting company, having a distinct recruiting team, 
establishment and utilization of the database of the high performers, and paying 
signing bonus. Discharge rate was the size of employment adjustment in the last 
year divided by the total number of employees, times 100. Labor-management 
relations were controlled following previous research (Kizilos and Reshef, 1997), 
and measured with five-point scale from “1” (very conflictive) to “5” (very 
cooperative). 
 
Analysis and measurement check 
Cluster analysis was used to identify employee-organization relationship 
(Wang et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2009) using the HRM practices. The k-means 
clustering procedure suggested a four-cluster solution to be most meaningful. 
Overall, the conceptual typology of EOR (Tsui et al., 1997) fits well with the 
suggested cluster profiles. Table 1 shows the mean scores on each HRMI and 
HRME dimension for each of the four clusters. As both dimensions are the 
aggregated indexes of standardized scores of HRM practices, I only suggested the 
raw scores of the four clusters. The first cluster has the scores for both HRMI and 
HRME above the average, which represents the mutual investment EOR. The 
second cluster shows that the score for HRMI is higher than sample average, but 
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for the HRME dimension the score is below the sample average, which represents 
over-investment EOR. In the third cluster the score for HRMI is under the sample 
average, whereas the score for HRME dimension is over the sample average, which 
is consistent with the under-investment EOR. In the last cluster, the scores on both 
dimensions were below the sample average, aligning with the quasi-spot contract 
EOR. 
To test if there is a significant difference between HRMI and HRME 
dimensions across the four clusters of EOR, I performed a multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA). Results showed that there was a significant difference 
between clusters (Hotelling’s T = 5.693, FT = 215.372; Wilks’ λ = .100, Fλ = 
164.723; p < .001). Univariate F-tests also indicated a significant difference on the 
four clusters of EOR (p <.001).   
 















233 49 64 52 68  
HRMI .12 2.45 0.69 -1.16 -1.29 135.68*** 
HRME .12 2.79 -0.48 1.54 -2.32 264.228*** 
*** p < .001 
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To test the hypotheses, regression analysis was used. I treated 
underinvestment approach as the referent group of EOR type, non-financial 
industry as the referent group of Industry, stability market strategy as the referent 
group of market strategy, complete CEO management system as the referent group 
of management system. 
 
Ⅳ. RESULTS 
Table 2 shows means, standard deviations for, and correlations among all 
the variables. Table 3 presents the clustered regression results of predicting 
organizational trust and human capital as the dependent variables (Hypothesis 1 and 
6).  In Model 1 of Table 3, control variables were entered. Model 2 showed that 
firms adopting mutual investment (β = .16, 𝑝 <  .05)  and overinvestment (β =
.12, 𝑝 <  .05)  EOR forms were significantly and positively related to 
organizational trust as expected. EOR-based HRM system increased R2 by 2% of 
organizational trust (∆R2 = .02, p < .05). Hence, Hypothesis 1 was supported. This 
result corroborated the previous research of Zhang et al. (2008) studied in the 
Chinese context. The relationship between EOR-based HRM system and human 
capital was shown in Model 2 of human capital. Mutual investment (β = .19, 𝑝 <
 .01) was significantly related to human capital in a positive direction. EOR-based 
31 
HRM system explained an additional 3% of the variation in human capital (∆R2 
= .03, p < .05). Thus, Hypothesis 6 was supported.  
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Table 2. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 M s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 





   
 
                  










                  











                  














                  













                  














                 






































               








































































































































          























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes. n = 319 (firms).  
* p < .05  
** p < .01 
1Dummy code, 1 = manufacturer. 2Dummy code, 1 = financial firm. 3Dummy code, 1 = non-financial firm. 4Dummy code, 1 = first mover market strategy. 5Dummy code, 1 = 
fast follower market strategy. 6Dummy code, 1 = stability market strategy. 7Dummy code, 1 = complete owner management system. 8Dummy code, 1 = CEO management 
system with great intervention from the owner. 9Dummy code, 1 = CEO management system with a little intervention from the owner. 10Dummy code, 1 = complete CEO 
management system. 11Dummy code, 1 = firms with mutual investment employee-organization relationship. 12Dummy code, 1 = firms with overinvestment employee-




Regression Results Predicting Organizational Trust and Human Capital 
(Hypothesis 1 and 6) 
 
Organizational trust Human capital 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Firm size 
.18** .14* .29** .23** 
Industry 1 
-.01 -.08 -.14* -.21** 
Industry 2 
-.05 -.04 -.02 .00 
Firm age 
.00 .00 -.09 -.09 
First mover 
.26** .25** .10 .08 
Fast follower 
.11 .10 -.10 -.11 
Management 1 
-.26** -.26** -.12 -.11 
Management 2 
-.14* -.12 -.13* -.12 
Management 3 
-.10 -.11 -.09 -.11 
Selective staffing 
-.10 -.14* .00 -.04 
Discharge rate 
-.10 -.11* -.03 -.04 
Union relationship 
.15** .14** .07 .06 








Quasi-spot contract  
.00 
 .00 
Total R2 .18** .20** .18** .21** 
∆ R2 .18** .02* .18** .03* 
 Note. n = 319 (firms), Standardized coefficients (β) are reported. 
* p < .05  





Regression Results Predicting Firm Performances with Organizational Trust  
(Hypothesis 2, 3, 4, & 5) 
 Exploration Exploitation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Firm size .26** .21** .16** .09 
Industry 1 .06 .09 -.06 -.02 
Industry 2 -.01 .00 -.03 -.01 
Firm age -.03 -.03 -.09 -.09 
First mover .14* .03 .29** .15** 
Fast follower -.05 -.09 .15* .10 
Management 1 -.12 -.01 -.09 .05 
Management 2 -.19** -.13* .00 .06 
Management 3 -.06 -.02 -.01 .05 
Selective staffing -.13* -.07 -.02 .06 
Discharge rate -.02 .03 .01 .07 
Union relationship .09 .03 .14** .07 
Mutual investment .05 -.01 .19** .10 
Overinvestment .06 .01 .12 .05 
Quasi-spot contract -.04 -.04 -.06 -.06 
Organizational trust  .43**  .54** 
Total R2 .17** .32** .23** .46** 
∆ R2 .17** .15** .23** .24** 
Note. n = 319 (firms), Standardized coefficients (β) are reported. 
* p < .05  





Regression Results Predicting Firm Performances with Human Capital 
(Hypothesis 7, 8, 9, &10)  
 Exploration Exploitation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Firm size .26** .13** .16** .10 
Industry 1 .06 .18** -.06 .00 
Industry 2 -.01 -.01 -.03 -.03 
Firm age -.03 .02 -.09 -.07 
First mover .14* .09 .29** .27** 
Fast follower -.05 .01 .15* .18** 
Management 1 -.12 -.05 -.09 -.06 
Management 2 -.19** -.12* .00 .03 
Management 3 -.06 .00 -.01 .02 
Selective staffing -.13* -.11* -.02 -.01 
Discharge rate -.02 .01 .01 .02 
Union relationship .09 .05 .14** .13* 
Mutual investment .05 -.06 .19** .13* 
Overinvestment .06 .02 .12 .10 
Quasi-spot contract -.04 -.04 -.06 -.06 
Human capital  .59**  .29** 
Total R2 .17** .45** .23** .29** 
∆ R2 .17** .28** .23** .06** 
Note. n = 319 (firms), Standardized coefficients (β) are reported. 
* p < .05  




Table 4 shows the relationship between organizational trust and the firm’s 
ambidextrous performances (Hypothesis 2 and 3). As shown in Model 2 of 
exploration, when EOR-based HRM system and other control variables were 
controlled, there was a significant positive relationship between organizational trust 
and firm’s explorative performance (β = .43, 𝑝 <   .01). Organizational trust 
explained an additional 15% of the variation in explorative firm performance (∆R2 
= .15, p < .01). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. The results shown in Model 2 
of exploitation showed that organizational trust had a positive and significant 
relationship with firm’s explorative performance ( β = .54, 𝑝 <   .01)  and 
explained an additional 24% of the variation in exploitative firm performance (∆R2 
= .24, p < .01). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported.  
I tested the mediation hypotheses (Hypothesis 4 and 5) using the mediation 
process suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008). Compared to Baron and Kenny’s 
conservative method of verifying mediation effects, Preacher and Hayes’s (2004) 
mediation process method can overcome the shortcomings of the old method and 
utilize potentially valuable data efficiently (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Preacher 
and Hayes (2008) proposed three conditions to test the mediation effects. First, the 
independent variable and the mediator should have a significant correlation. Second, 
after controlling for the independent variable, the mediator and the dependent 
variable should be significantly correlated. Third, the indirect effect of the 
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independent variable on the dependent variable should be significant. As the first 
and second condition was satisfied through the regression models, the indirect 
effects of mutual investment on exploration and exploitation were identified using 
Hayes’s (2013) SPSS process model. The bootstrapping test revealed that the 
indirect effects of mutual investment on both exploration (95% CI = [.01, .08]) and 
exploitation (95% CI = [.01, .13]) were significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 and 5 
were supported.   
The effects of human capital on organizational performances of exploration 
and exploitation (Hypothesis 7 and 8) are demonstrated in Table 5. In Model 2 of 
exploration, human capital was significantly and positively related to exploration 
(β = .59, 𝑝 <   .01) and explained an additional 28% of the variation in the 
firm’s explorative performance (∆R2 = .28, p < .01). Hence, Hypothesis 7 was 
supported. Also, Model 2 of exploitation supported Hypothesis 8, as human capital 
had a significant positive correlation with exploitation (β = .29, 𝑝 <   .01) and 
an additional 6% of the variation in the explorative performance was explained by 
human capital (∆R2 = .6, p < .01).  
The mediation effect of human capital (Hypothesis 9 and 10) was tested 
through the method of Preacher and Hayes (2003), as well. The bootstrapping test 
revealed that the indirect effect of mutual investment on exploration was significant 
(95% CI = [.04, .18]), but not on exploitation (95% CI = [-.00, .04]). Thus, 
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Hypothesis 9 was supported, but Hypothesis 10 was not. 
 
Ⅴ. DISCUSSION 
This study contributes to SHRM literature by providing theoretical 
explanations on the link between HRM system and the organizational ambidexterity. 
Based on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and inducement-contribution concept 
of March and Simon (1958), the study classified HRM practices into two 
dimensions, inducement and expectation-enhancement. It, further, verified the 
synergistic effects between the two dimensions by revealing that the organizations 
allocated to four different EOR types had different effects on organizational trust, 
human capital, and the firm’s explorative and exploitative performances. The 
results showed that the firms with mutual investment form perform best, in that high 
level of HRMI and HRME dimension would make synergistic effects on both 
explorative and exploitative performances. This contradicts the previous researches 
on contextual ambidexterity discriminating HRM practices necessary for 
exploration and exploitation (Patel et al., 2013). 
This study provides several insights for the fields of employee-organization 
relationship. First, the study investigated the effects of EOR-based HRM at the 
organizational level, which has been neglected in the context of EOR. While most 
of prior studies have focused on the individual level outcomes, this study extended 
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the understanding by illustrating how the EOR-based HRM system fosters the 
organizational effectiveness. Second, the study adopted two different kinds of 
operational performance, exploitation and exploration, as dependent variables, 
allowing to estimate more proximal outcomes of HR effectiveness than other 
financial measures. Moreover, Tsui et al. (1997) argued that the employees’ 
performances on core tasks, which may be considered as exploitative performance 
at organizational level, are highest in quasi-spot contract EOR forms, since 
employees fully concentrate on the narrowly-defined specific tasks when given the 
specified amount of contingent rewards. However, the results from this study 
contradicts this assumption that both exploration and exploitation can be 
encouraged when both the level of HRMI and HRME dimensions are high. Third, 
the study suggested two different processes to explain the effectiveness of EOR. 
One is a social exchange route, which has been a dominated explanation in the 
context of EOR. This highlights the psychological perspective that individuals are 
willing to reciprocate what they received from the organization. The other 
perspective, which this study newly suggests, is about how the mutual investment 
EOR firms attract and retain superior human capital. It assumes more ego-centric 
and rational person rather than scrupulous and benevolent person. The high-quality 
human resources favor organizations that provide abundant rewards and fair 
appraisal system that compensate their high abilities, thereby leading to sort into 
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and remain in the organization. Contrary to Shaw et al. (2009) , which suggested 
that good performers enjoy overinvestment EOR forms, this study demonstrated 
that people who settle in prominent positions could be detrimental for performance 
of the organization and driven out in the long run. Finally, this study clarified the 
conceptual distinction between psychological contract and employee-organization 
relationship by adopting HRM practices as a measure for EOR. This corresponds 
with the employer’s perspective classification of employee-organization 
relationship. 
The results also provide practical implications for managers. An increasing 
number of organizations try to implement HRM practices forming underinvestment 
or quasi-spot contract EOR approaches as makeshifts for current financial 
difficulties. However, in order to weather crises and attain incremental and radical 
innovation, firms are required to possess HRM system forming the mutual 
investment EOR forms. In the mutual investment EOR firms, the existing 
employees are possible to enhance their performance since they cognitively trust 
the organization. Moreover, the high-quality human resources would be willing to 
sort into the organization and commit to the organization for a longer period of time. 
Lastly, HRM practices in HRMI dimension, such as competitive pay and 
developmental opportunities, are insufficient to attract the star or high performers. 
As the employees socially compare their rewards with others in the organization, 
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extensive performance evaluation with diverse pay-for-performance systems 
should be supplemented. 
   
Limitations and Future Research 
Although this study provides a number of contributions and practical 
implications, it still has some limitations which future research may address. First, 
hypotheses were tested using a data sample of Korean firms. Since cultural effects 
play a significant role in organizations, the results may not be generalized. However, 
many other studies regarding EOR approaches have been done in the context of 
China or Western countries (Tsui et al., 1997), investigating the effects of EOR 
approaches in diverse cultural contexts contributes to the stream of research. 
Second, clustered regression does not allow to differentiate firms in the same 
categories. Even though the MANOVA tests was performed to validate the 
significant differences between the clusters, each firm within the same category 
may have diverse characteristics. Third, owing to the limitation of cross-sectional 
data set, the interpretation of results is limited to a certain time period. Since the 
return of exploration is distant and uncertain (March, 1991), the effectiveness of 
HRM practices with high inducements and expectations on the explorative 
performance might appear in the long run. In future research, longitudinal research 
should be done in order to fully observe the relationship between EOR-based HRM 
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system and firm performance. Forth, general human capital was measured in this 
study. As Crook et al. (2011) pointed out, firm-specific human capital has a stronger 
relationship with firm performance, since firm-specific human capital is hard to 
exchange, forming the imperfectly competitive market. Future research can 
investigate the effect of EOR-based HRM system on the attraction and retention of 
firm-specific human capital. Fifth, the study concentrated on the positive effects 
that mutual investment EOR firms have. However, future studies are encouraged to 
analyze other EOR approaches, such as quasi-spot contract, underinvestment, and 
overinvestment approaches, having positive or negative effects on the firm 
performances through other mechanisms. Generally, quasi-spot contract or 
underinvestment lead negative attitudes toward the organizations and result in 
negative individual performances or increase voluntary turnover intentions (Tsui et 
al., 1997). However, some internal or external contingencies, such as market 
strategy (Wang et al., 2009), supervisory support (Zhang et al., 2009), traditionality 
of middle managers (Zhang et al., 2014), or task complexity (Jia et al., 2014) might 
moderate the relationships between EOR forms and the outcome variables. 
Therefore, future research should uncover some other contingent variables affecting 





 Researches focusing on employee-organization relationship have been on 
the rise, yet little is known about the underlying process of how it ensures the 
ambidextrous organization. This research verified the mediating role of 
organizational trust and superior human capital on the relationship between EOR-
based HRM system and explorative and exploitative performances. In addition to 
social exchange route which has been emphasized, individuals with great 
knowledge, skills, and abilities make decisions on whether they enter or stay in the 
organization by comparing one’s potential and realized benefits with others 
internally and externally. I anticipate that future researchers extend these findings 
by examining other factors explaining the link between EOR-based HRM system 
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조직-구성원 관계 기반 인사시스템과 









기업이 지향하는 고용관계는 그 기업의 인사시스템에 투영된다. 
급변하는 경영환경에 대응하기 위해 많은 한국 기업들이 연공주의에 
기반한 경직된 고용관계에서 유연한 고용관계로 이행하고자 
인사시스템의 변화를 추구하고 있다. 그 인사시스템의 조직 성과에 
대한 영향은 조직의 인적자본 수준과 조직 구성원들의 조직에 대한 
인식을 통해 달라질 수 있다.  
고용관계와 인사시스템은 본질적으로 연결되어 있으나, 기존에 
인사시스템을 ‘조직과 구성원의 관계’라는 관점에서 분석한 연구는 
58 
드물었다. 이에 본 연구는 조직-구성원 관계 분석법에 기반한 
인사시스템이 어떻게 조직의 양면적 성과에 영향을 끼치는지 그 
메커니즘을 밝히고자 한다. 조직-구성원 관계 분석법은 인사시스템에 
관한 기존 논의에 이론적 기반을 제공하고, 고용관계 변화를 추구하는 
조직이 활용과 탐색의 양면적 성과를 동시에 달성하기 위해서 어떠한 
인사 전략을 선택해야하는가에 관해 실무적 시사점을 제공한다는 
점에서 의미가 있다.  
조직-구성원 관계 분석법에 따르면, 조직의 인사제도를 ‘유인과 
투자 기반 인사제도’와 ‘기대 증진 인사제도’의 두 가지 차원으로 
분류할 수 있다. 이 두 가지 차원의 인사제도 시행 수준에 따라 기업은 
네 가지 인사시스템 (상호 투자, 과대 투자, 과소 투자, 준지점 계약) 
중 하나의 형태를 가진다. 사회적 교환 이론, 사회적 비교 이론, 
인적자본이론을 바탕으로, 유인과 투자 기반 인사제도와 기대 증진 
인사제도의 시행 수준이 모두 높은 상호 투자 인사시스템을 가진 
기업이 조직 신뢰, 인적 자본과 긍정적 상관을 가지고, 이것이 
궁극적으로 조직의 활용과 탐색적 성과와 긍정적 상관을 가진다는 
가설을 설정하였다.   
인적자본기업패널 2013년도 조사자료를 활용하여, 319개 국내 
기업을 위의 네 가지 인사시스템으로 군집화하여 군집회귀분석을 
시행하였다. 그 결과 가설이 전반적으로 지지되었다. 본 연구는 기존에 
개인 수준에서 이루어졌던 조직-구성원 관계에 관한 논의를 조직 
수준으로 확장하고, 조직-구성원 관계 기반 인사시스템이 조직의 
활용과 탐색적 성과를 향상시키는 두 가지 다른 경로를 통합적으로 
살펴보았다는 점에서 의미가 있다.  
59 
 
주요어: 조직-구성원 관계, 인사시스템, 조직 신뢰, 인적 자본, 조직 양
면성, 탐색과 활용  
학번: 2014-20448 
 
